The DMZ as Digital Divide: ICT and Communication in Korean Unification

In an earlier post this morning I mused about the implications of cloud computing for international and national security, and suggested that "the growth of cyberspace is emerging as perhaps the single most important factor in, among other things, Korean unification." Shortly after publishing the post, I became aware of some new resources relating to the topic.
First, The Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University earlier this year published a report entitled U.S.-DPRK Educational Exchanges: Assessment and Future Strategy.  Fortunately, the Stanford volume can be downloaded in PDF format, so I encourage you to use the preceding hyperlink to do so and read it.  Unfortunately, the Stanford volume devotes far to little attention to the exceedingly important role of information and communications technology (ICT) in Korean unification.  For evidence of this, readers may wish to read prior posts on this blog about this important topic at this link, or search for "unification" or "DMZ."
A second resource is the web site of The National Committee on North Korea. As noted in its mission statement, it "...advances, promotes and facilitates engagement between citizens of the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It works to reduce tensions and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula and improve the well being of the citizens of the DPRK. Through cooperation on concrete activities addressing specific problems, NCNK seeks to enhance broad-based understanding and mutual trust. NCNK supports transitions enabling the DPRK to become a full participant in the community of nations. The National Committee's principles of engagement focus on addressing urgent humanitarian needs, implementing long-term development, building sustained partnerships, fostering mutual understanding, and helping to avoid conflict on the Korean Peninsula."
Although pleased to see the above new resources, I am disappointed at the lack of a more comprehensive discussion of the role of ICT and communication in Korean unification.  It is such an obvious factor, especially in 2011 with the unfolding "Arab Spring" and international commentary on the role of digital, mobile and social media in it.  Even back in 1995, when my book on The Telecommunications Revolution in Korea was published, it demanded a full chapter (Chapter 9: "Toward One World: Beyond all Barriers": Communications and National Reunification).  Since that time, I have followed the topic mainly through posts on this blog.  Among them, my 2008 post about Johann Galtung's perspective on unification, and in 2009, Andrei Lankov's thoughts on the matter, deserve reading.
In conclusion, I would simply underscore the obvious for further research, theorizing, publication and discussion of the role of ICT and communication in Korean unification.

A Communication Theory of Korean Unification

This post was prompted by an article entitled "Five Theories of Unification," by Victor Cha of Georgetown University who also holds the Korea Chair at CSIS.  It appeared in The Korea Joongang Daily and in a slightly different form on the Korea Chair Platform.  The article briefly sketches five possible perspectives on unification that correspond roughly to different periods in Korean history and different presidential administrations.   However, readers of this blog will not be surprised to learn that I found another very persuasive perspective on Korean unification missing from Professor Cha's analysis, and that is the communication and network theoretic point of view.  (Check out my prior numerous posts on this topic here.)  My hunch that something was missing in the five theories was confirmed by viewing President Park Geun Hye's historic speech in Dresden earlier this year, where she laid out her three-point agenda for Korean unification.   The accompanying YouTube video contains the Arirang Television live broadcast of her speech, with simultaneous translation in English (the speech begins at 35:44 of the video, should you choose to view it here).
As I've discussed in earlier posts, communication is in many ways the essence of the unification problem, both in terms of digital network infrastructure for modern mobile broadband and in terms of human communication across what President Park described in her speech as a "wall of distrust" and a "socio-cultural" divide that has grown on the Korean peninsula over the past 70 years.
I also found it highly significant that President Park chose the Dresden University of Technology for her speech, which she began with reference to a Korean saying that "the impact of education lasts for generations and beyond."  She followed that by noting that she herself had majored in electrical engineering and that she firmly believed science and technology were the key to unlocking a nation's growth.  "This is why I established the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning early in my presidency and this is also precisely why I have been highlighting the importance of building a creative economy."
All of the three main points in President Park's Dresden speech involve strong elements of human communication of different sorts, ranging from reunification of divided families, to building telecommunications, transportation and other forms of infrastructure.   Communication is arguably, as Wilbur Schramm wrote years ago, the "fundamental social process."  As Korea's continued tragic division shows, it is also central to politics and economics.  Finally, it is an essential ingredient in education at all levels, underscored over the past several years by the rapid rise of massive open online courses (MOOCs).  Near the conclusion of her speech, President Park envisioned a day when young students from North and South Korea (like those in her audience at Dresden University of Technology) would study together side by side on a unified Korean peninsula.

Unification: Korea's highways and information superhighways

The news reported today in The Korea Joongang Daily under the headline "South pushes plan to reconnect rails and roads," made me think of the relative role of high speed rail and expressway links on the Korean peninsula versus linkages of fiber optic cable and other networks for digital communication. (click on graphic to see a full size version)  As noted in the article, "The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport said Tuesday it will push forward a project this year to restore severed sections of inter-Korean railroads and highways. The project was announced as part of the ministry’s 2015 agenda. It is also part of the Park Geun-hye administration’s ambitious proposal to operate trains from Seoul to cities in the North this summer in celebration of the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan’s colonial rule - but only if Pyongyang goes along. Earlier this month, the Ministry of Unification unveiled a plan to restore the two Koreas’ western and eastern railways to operate trains this summer from Seoul to the North Korean cities of Rajin and Sinuiju. Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae has said the goal is to link the railways and have trains operating in time for the Aug. 15 Liberation Day."
The digital networks are arguably just as important in any plan for unification as the transportation networks, since the whole world seems to acknowledge their central role as infrastructure for the 21st century.  Furthermore, North Korea lacks both modern transportation and communication infrastructure which means that the process of national unification will inevitably involve a costly, long term effort to build these.  Consequently, one can envision a simultaneous effort to build both types of infrastructure, in which fiber optic cables are laid alongside railroad and expressway routes.  Whether that becomes politically possible is an open question, but I would argue that in today's hyperconnected era the digital network connections are of equal or greater importance for Korean unification than the ground transportation links.

U.S. Policy on Korean Unification: CSIS roundtable on "China's policy toward Korean peninsula reunification"

The series of discussions being held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington and led by Victor Cha, are off to a strong start.  The topic of the April event, co-hosted by the Global Peace Foundation, caught my attention as I have posted regularly (those of you who don't regularly read this blog may wish to review these posts) over recent years on the topic of Korean unification and the role of communication and the ICT sector in it.  However, I must confess that, after viewing the main presentation by Sid Seiler, Special Envoy for the Six Party Talks at the Department of State, I was disappointed.  Apparently, the U.S. government has still not grasped the need to come out with a clear statement, at this stage of history preferably from the President or the Secretary of State, on official U.S. policy toward Korean unification.
I cannot count the number of times, over my years in Korea, that I've listened to Korean colleagues or acquaintances tell me that they believe the United States is "opposed" to Korean unification.  I dare say this is a fairly widespread view in South Korea, and not without justification.  From the 1970s, when I first set foot in Korea, to the present, there has been no clear articulation, at the highest levels (meaning President or Secretary of State)  of U.S. government policy relating to Korean unification.  If you take the time to view Ambassador Seiler's  presentation on the embedded video, you'll understand my continuing disappointment.

President Park's Dresden Declaration: An Initiative for Peaceful Unification of Korea

South Korea's President Park Geun-hye yesterday delivered a powerful speech, (click on the accompanying photo to see a full size version) outlining her administration's approach to peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula.  Readers of this blog will know of my concern with the role of communication and telecommunications infrastructure in Korean unification, or as it is sometimes called "reunification."  (see a selection of past posts here)
President Park's speech resonated strongly not only with topics covered in this blog, but with me personally, for several reasons.
First, as the son of a Lutheran minister, I was struck by the fact that she chose Dresden, a city that was part of East Germany during the Cold War as the location for her speech.  As reported by The Korea Joongang Daily, her first visit while in Dresden was to the Frauenkirche, a Lutheran church destroyed during the bombing of Dresden during World War II.
 (Click on the accompanying AP photo of her visit to the church to see a full-size version.) As noted in the article, "Her visit to the historic site, which embodies eastern Germany’s rise from ruins to an economic powerhouse, is in tune with her intention to obtain a blueprint for the unification of the Korean Peninsula while in Europe. “President Park chose Dresden as the locale for her symbolic address to show both Koreas that unification may actually turn out to be an opportunity for prosperity,” a Blue House official said."
Second, as reported in another article by the same newspaper, President Park gave her address right after receiving an honorary doctorate from the Dresden University of Technology, one of the most prestigious schools in Germany. I believe that KAIST, where I currently work, has a number of ties and common interests with this university in Dresden.
Finally, President Park's speech contained three specific proposals to North Korea,.  The full text of President Park's address was printed by The Korea Herald.   While the selection of excerpts cannot do justice to such a powerful speech, several points made by President Park were of particular relevance to topics treated in this blog, including the following.
"As one who studied electronic engineering in college, I hold dear the belief that science and technology are the key to unlocking a nation's advancement. This is why I established the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning early in my presidency and have been highlighting the importance of building a creative economy."
President Park invoked the memory of her father and his visit to Germany, saying that "The Korean president who visited Germany at the time felt that Germany's rise from the ashes of the Second World War and its Miracle on the Rhine were feats that could be replicated in Korea. As he was driven on the autobahn and shown the steel mills of German industry, he became convinced that Korea too would need its own autobahn and its own steel industry to effect an economic take-off."
The second of President Park's three main proposals dealt with infrastructure.  She said, "Second, we must pursue together an agenda for co-prosperity through the building of infrastructure that support the livelihood of people. . . . To help make life less uncomfortable for ordinary North Koreans, Korea could invest in infrastructure-building projects where possible, such as in transportation and telecommunication."
I highly recommend reading the full text of this important address and initiative.

Unification Broadcasts Draw Criticism from North Korea

The Chosun Ilbo carried a report with an interesting bit of evidence about how information gets form South Korea to North Korea these days. North Korea has called on South Korea to halt its broadcasts on unification, saying they are insulting and provocative. North Korea's government-run news agency KCNA, in an article Friday, denounced the South's Unification Ministry for launching broadcasts, which it said were meant to tarnish the communist country. The article quoted the North Korean committee which handles inter-Korean affairs as calling the move a grave provocation. South Korea's Unification Ministry, which is in charge of relations with North Korea, recently launched weekly television broadcasts and daily online radio broadcasts to try to raise public awareness on potential unification with North Korea.

Communication is central in Korean reunification

As readers of this blog will know, I've been concerned over the years with the important and apparently increasing role of communication in Korean reunification.   I basically agree with Galtung's perspective on Korean unification, as noted in this 2008 post.
Two articles in Korea's English papers this morning relate to the central role of communication in Korean reunification.  One was a review of President Lee Myung Bak's farewell speech in the Korea Joongang Daily. In that speech he issued a strong message to North Korea. “Although the North Korean regime refuses to change, the people in the North are changing fast and no one can stop it,” Lee said. “We are observing the change closely. I strongly believe that the era of unification is not far off. We need to hurry to be ready for unification. Of course, a strong security posture must be the basis for our preparation.”  As noted in many earlier posts on this blog, the change taking place among the North Korean people is occurring in no small part because of the influence of mobile communication and digital devices which are multiplying the channels through which citizens in the North can receive or send information.
The growth and spread of digital networks and social networking is also having an impact in China that relates directly to Korean reunification.  In a recent post I mentioned the alarming implications of a recent U.S. Senate report on China's official attitude toward unification of Korea.  However, the concern I expressed in that post may be only part of the picture in China.  As noted by the Chosun Ilbo this morning, Chinese netizens have begun to express their displeasure with the Chinese government's failure to restrain North Korea from conducting its recent nuclear test.  This displeasure has led to public demonstrations in several Chinese cities.
In short, the impact of the public and public perceptions in China and  North Korea should not be underestimated as a factor in Korean reunification.

Media on the death of Kim Jong Il: National Unification

Another striking aspect of the first hours and days of international media coverage of the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is the relative lack of attention to Korea's division, or put the other way, the problem or challenge of national reunification.  After all, in the broad sweep of history, Korea's division is an aberration that has only lasted a bit over half a century for a nation whose history stretches back thousands of years.  Most of the media references to division go back only to the Korean war and use the old cold war perspective to explain how Korea was divided and the implications thereof.
Most Koreans instinctively understand that national division is a fundamental problem and that unification is necessary to solve this quintessential political problem in Northeast Asia.  That is why South Korea maintains a government ministry devoted to unification.  However, as an article in Foreign Policy suggests, many South Koreans, especially its youth, are not all that enthusiastic about unification with North Korea.  I believe that the author of this article pushes the point too far in one sentence where he claims that "Despite the fear that a hostile nuclear-armed state without a clear leader in charge could instill in its neighbors, most South Koreans here really just don't seem to care about what happens in the North."

Communication and National Reunification

Professor Johan Galtung, one of the world's towering intellects, with whose work I became acquainted in graduate school, was in Korea recently for a guest lecture at Dong-A University in Pusan. Early in his scholarly career he thought about and published on the topic of the international flow of news. Therefore, what follows in this post should not be surprising, but I was pleasantly surprised to learn that he had come to Korea and addressed specifically the central political issue here. His guest lecture was entitled "Peace in the Global Era and Perspectives of the Unification on the Korean Peninsula" According to the author of the Left Flank blog, "Galtung quickly laid out his five-point lecture. He began with his distinction between negative and positive peace, and applied it the Korean peninsula. The goal of resolving the Korean armistice precedes political unification. After characterizing the North Korean state as "fundamentalist Confucian", Galtung then argued that unification only necessitated the free flow of people, goods and services, and information and ideas between the two Korean states, not the dissolution of ROK and DPRK into a single Korean state. Galtung buttressed this point by that of three other scenarios, conquest, collapse, or peaceful dissolution, the first two were violent, and the last has never occurred in human history. Galtung termed this "national reconciliation without the unification of two states". Galtung subsequently considered confederation as a starting political point, but unnecessary. " (My emphasis added.)

It is significant that Galtung mentions the free flow of five things: people, goods, services, information and ideas. One could hardly make a better argument that the communication and digital divide between North and South Korea are at the heart of national division today. Accordingly, the opening up of free communication is tantamount to national reunification. In fact, I would argue that if services include modern communications services, which in turn require modern fiber-optic and mobile networks, the five necessities Galtung mentions will result in Korean reunification. I would go further to speculate that fulfilling these necessities will be the beginning of the end of two states on the Korean peninsula. Anyone who has lived in Korea for more than a decade, as I have, will know that free flow of information on this peninsula, culturally speaking, leads directly and probably quickly (빨리빨리) to reunification.

American views and the future of the Korea-U.S. alliance

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has released another in its continuing series of public opinion polls measuring the views of Americans on issues related to Korea and the U.S.-Korea alliance.  The headline from the report published by the council zeroes in on the finding that, "..in a hypothetical North-led invasion of South Korea, 47 percent of the American public support the use of U.S. troops to defend South Korea (49% opposed).  This marks an all time high.  When the question was first asked in 1974, fewer than two in ten stated support."  In other findings, 55% of Americans viewed North Korea's nuclear weapons program as a critical threat.  This, along with mainstream press coverage of North Korea's young leader and his sometimes bizarre behavior are the most likely cause of increased public support for defending South Korea, if it is attacked.  Remember, in historical perspective, that the Korean war itself was unpopular with the war-weary American public after WWII and that reality helped sweep Dwight Eisenhower to a landslide victory in the 1952 presidential election.
One of the poll findings that I found most interesting was the shift in public views in the U.S. about what should happen after North and South Korea reunify.  As shown in the accompanying graphic, the number who think that the U.S. should maintain its alliance but remove ground troops increased substantially from the 2010 poll results.  I have long held the view that most all of the U.S. forces in Korea should be withdrawn upon unification, and perhaps even used as an incentive to encourage peaceful unification.  The only reason for maintaining such a large presence here would be if the reunified Korea requested it and if the regional security situation demanded it.  However, peaceful unification itself would remove the main reason for such a large U.S. military presence here.  A firm foundation for the future alliance between Korea and the U.S. is much more likely to be based on such factors as trade, technology, and commerce along with continued significant educational exchange and collaboration.

The Korea Discount: Information Age Politics in Korea

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war and the division of the peninsula into North and South Korea. Over the past six decades, the South has developed into a technologically advanced country and is one of the world's leading exporters. On a day-to-day basis, people living in South Korea don't think much about the possible outbreak of war, even after the recent Cheonan incident. However, the world's mainstream media--television, newspapers, magazines and the business press--continue to frame the Korean situation in terms of national division and the threat of war on the peninsula. Nowhere is this more evident than in the continued widespread application and acceptance of the so-called "Korea Discount." As reported in the Joongang Daily this morning, the global rating agency Standard and Poors reports that uncertainty surrounding North Korea’s power transfer is weighing on South Korea’s sovereign credit rating because of the possibility of war and the potential for huge unification costs.  “Significant uncertainties remain from a possible succession in the near future in North Korea,” Standard & Poor’s (S&P) said. “We continue to view instability as an important constraint on the creditworthiness of South Korea.”
The credit rating agency said the South Korean presidential council estimated earlier this year that sudden unification could cost the country $2.14 trillion by 2040 and raise government debt to 147 percent of gross domestic product (GPD) in that year, compared with the government’s estimate of 36 percent by the end of this year. It would be interesting to see an estimate of how much the "Korea Discount" has cost South Korea over recent decades in lost foreign direct investment or other costs directly related to its application.
Moreover, the Korea discount is really only information that estimates the probability of future conflict or economic burdens on the Korean peninsula. As such, it illustrates the power of information, created by the mainstream and financial media and disseminated instantly via the internet. From a certain perspective, one might say that the most stable thing on the Korean peninsula for almost sixty years now has been the nation's division.  How does one really estimate the possibility of a peaceful or gradual unification of Korea versus a sudden, disruptive one?  The nature of the "Korea discount" and its real, empirical meaning and value deserve much more attention in era of information age politics. Perhaps some of you who occasionally read this blog can shed more light on the topic. Comments are welcome.

Korea's DMZ as a Digital Divide: Examining the Implications

In one of the earliest posts on this blog, back in late 2007, I noted the significance of Korea's DMZ as a digital divide.  Although much of the news about Korea these days is about the recent North Korean shelling of Yongpyeong Island or its nuclear program, there are some valuable bits of news here and there about the digital divide between the two Koreas, which deserves much more attention.
Stuart Fox has an interesting article about "The Technological Hassles of a Potential Korean Reunification," which draws heavily on interviews with faculty from Syracuse University, which continues an ongoing IT-related exchange program with Kimchaek University in Pyongyang.  The article contains some informed speculation on what might happen when the world's most digitally networked nation, South Korea, moves toward unification with one of the least digitally networked countries in the world, North Korea.    I would add that the implications of the current, growing ICT infrastructure disparity between North and South Korea is a topic that deserves not only more attention in the news, but also more serious and in-depth research.  For example, there is speculation in the article that unification might enable North Korea to leapfrog by quickly building new mobile networks.  To what extent is this really the case?  What of the need for terrestrial fiber optic networks that have taken South Korea decades to build?  An argument might be made that such a decades-long investment in fiber infrastructure will be necessary for full parity in communications infrastructure and for true and complete unification.
I also ran across the North Korea Tech blog, which contains regular posts on the development of the ICT sector in North Korea.  It is authored by Martyn Williams, Tokyo Bureau Chief for IDG News Service.
Back in the early 1990s when I was researching and writing The Telecommunications Revolution in Korea, it was already apparent that there were two broad aspects to Korean national division, from a communication perspective.  The first of these was the growing infrastructure disparity between North and South.   The second was that of the political implications of free flow of information in and out of North Korea.  Both are important, but these days the second area is getting more attention as cameras, phones and other electronic devices are becoming smaller, more mobile and more powerful, just as the internet and cloud computing become the norm for many.  In the current era it is literally impossible for any country to completely control the flow of information to and from its citizens.

U.S. policy, ICT and Korean reunification: an alarming new Senate report

The world has changed a great deal since Korea was divided at the 38th parallel after World War II, in no small part because of the revolutionary developments in semiconductors and telecommunications that fuel the information revolution. This is an underlying message of the recent visit to Pyongyang by Bill Richardson and Google's chairman, Eric Schmidt. As I have argued in numerous earlier posts (for example this June 2011 post) and in Chapter 8 of my Kindle book, Telecommunications and Transformation in Korea, communication  has always been a central reality in Korea's tragic national division, but the digital information revolution that started late in the 20th century has changed the game as the web, social and mobile media proliferate.
While the information revolution and economic development in China and other nations of the Asia Pacific region have changed the world, one thing remains unchanged and unfortunately stuck back in the Cold War era:  U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Northeast Asia region.  A core aspect of the problem is the failure of the United States, at the presidential level, to articulate a foreign policy that clearly addresses the question of Korean reunification, while publicly making it clear that the United States favors unification and will work with the Korean people toward that goal.  This is a policy failure not just of the Obama administration, but successive Republic and Democratic administrations. (President Obama and President Lee Myung Bak did issue a joint declaration several years ago advocating a united Korea that was at peace, but this was not the sort of message that captured the attention of mainstream media around the world.)  In foreign policy perceptions matter a great deal and it seems dangerous to allow even the slightest chance that people in Korea or other nations of this region will misunderstand U.S. intentions.   After all, Dean Rusk who played a critical role in the choice of the 38th parallel as a line to divide Korea between the advancing Soviet forces who entered the country from the North and the U.S. forces in the south, has publicly stated that, had he known more about Korea's history, the U.S. would never have proposed that dividing line.   Furthermore, U.S. representatives over the years have made it clear that there was never any intention to permanently divide Korea.
In this context, a report published last month for the U.S. Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations is alarming. (downloadable here in pdf format) Entitled "China's Impact on Korean Peninsula Unification and Questions for the Senate," the report explores China's historical claims to territory on the Korean peninsula and examines the possibility that China might actively oppose Korean reunification.  One possible reason for such opposition might be the presence of U.S. military forces in Korea. To me and I'm sure to many others, the prospect of Chinese opposition to peaceful reunification of Korea is alarming.  All the more reason, I would suggest, for the U.S. administration to articulate its policy on the main political problem here in Northeast Asia, Korea's national division.

What the media miss about Korea!

A word of warning.  This is a long post with no graphics.
As a U.S. citizen who has long resided and worked in South Korea and as a long term student of the role of television and the media in international affairs and foreign policy, I can no longer stay silent about mainstream media coverage of affairs on the Korean peninsula.  The media, including television, the press, digital and social media have presented a picture of Korea that centers around North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, the military confrontation on the peninsula, and the trading of insults via North Korean propaganda and the Twitter posts of President Donald Trump.
Looking back over recent decades at the U.S. Korea relationship, it is clear that there has been a failure of both the press and policy.  A long line of U.S. presidents, starting with Dwight Eisenhower, who was elected in 1952 on a pledge to end the Korean War have failed to achieve a peace treaty that would formally end that war here.  It is no exaggeration to suggest that the failure to address Korea’s division and the tense ceasefire and confrontation at the DMZ is one of the great policy failures of the 20th century, blame for which might be apportioned to the two Koreas and the surrounding big powers, China, Russia, Japan and the U.S.
The mainstream press has also failed.  My own research and that of others in the latter part of the 20th century documented a pattern of intermittent coverage of Korea by television and other mainstream media, focusing on the Korean peninsula mainly at times of crisis.   The picture or image of Korea that results tends to be superficial and seriously lacking in historical, political and cultural context.  In today’s hyper connected, digital era, this pattern appears to be only exacerbated.
To be specific, three topics deserve a great deal more attention when leaders and citizens around the world consider Korea today.   First, in just over four months, the Winter Olympics are scheduled to be held in Pyeongchang, a city in Gangweon Do, the only province in South Korea that is divided by the DMZ.  The legendary Diamond Mountain, site of North-South family reunions in years past, is in the northern half of the province.  Pyeongchang itself is only about 40 miles south of the DMZ.  Not coincidentally, some of the world’s most dense and advanced digital networks have been constructed in Pyeongchang and nearby venues as part of Korea’s plan to showcase next generation 5G networks along with some of the features of its nationwide Public Safety LTE network, schedule for completion by the end of 2018.   In another move that could hardly be sheer coincidence, North Korea’s young leader Kim Jong Un ordered construction of a “world class” ski resort near Masik Pass in the northern half of Gangweon Province.  In historical context, the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics will take place almost exactly three decades following the 1988 Seoul Olympics.  The Seoul Games were used very effectively to support the “Nordpolitik” of the South Korean government under President Roh Tae Woo.  China, the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and Vietnam all participated, nearly signaling an end to South Korea’s long Cold War isolation from those nations.   The IOC and the South Korean government made strenuous efforts to involve North Korea, but to no avail.
Today, the government of President Moon Jae-In is working with the IOC in an effort to have North Korea participate in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, against the backdrop of global media attention to the nuclear, missile and military threat on the peninsula.  As this is written the sports minister of France publicly suggested that her country might skip the 2018 Winter Games if the security risk is too great.  With just over four months to go before the games, other nations are no doubt considering their options.
A second topic that receives scant attention in the mainstream media coverage of Korea these days is the impact that war on the peninsula might have on the global economy.  Following President Trump’s “fire and fury” comment about North Korea in August of this year, Fortune magazine and much of the business press took note that war in Korea could spark a global depression.  This possibility deserves more attention and in depth treatment, especially considering South Korea’s dominant position in global markets for semiconductors, displays of all types and sizes, and smart phones, key components of the emerging digital network ecosystem.
Finally, the division of Korea can only be understood if it is placed in historical context. Korea can rightly claim a history stretching for thousands of years as a unified nation state.  Consequently, the division after World War II which has lasted less than seven decades is clearly an aberration.  The vast majority of Koreans, South and North, most especially those many members of divided families, yearn for unification.  Here in the South, and I suspect in the North as well, most hope that unification will come peacefully.  During the ancient Olympic Games in Greece, a truce was announced before and during the games to ensure that the host city was not attacked and so that athletes and spectators could safely attend the games.  Perhaps the impending Pyeongchang Winter Olympics might provide an opportunity for an “Olympic truce” during which the heated media rhetoric might give way to solving the regional and indeed global crisis on the Korean peninsula.

How Widespread is Mobile Phone Use in North Korea?

The English online version of The Chosun Ilbo this morning has a short, but fascinating article, entitled "How Widespread is Mobile Phone Use in North Korea?"  As readers of this blog will know, I've been following not only the extent of mobile phone usage in North Korea, but also its implications, in posts over the past several years.  According to The Chosun Ilbo article, the mobile phone penetration rate in North Korea is only about 1.3 percent, far lower than South Korea's 103.9 percent, but the average usage time amounts to 300 minutes, more or less the level of South Korea's. Hwang Sung-jin of the Korea Information Society Development Institute, said this is because of brisk usage among high-ranking North Korean officials.  The article also quotes Suk Ho-ick of KT, the chairman of the IT Unification Forum, on North Korea's efforts to control the use of mobile phones.

North Korea's Digital Underground

The Atlantic is carrying a very interesting article on the efforts of outside news organizations to gather and disseminate information from inside North Korea.  These developments have obvious implications for the future unification of Korea.   I recommend it to you.

The DMZ as a linguistic divide

I've posted frequently over the years on the role of Korea's demilitarized zone (DMZ) as a growing digital divide (read those posts here) and this post expands upon those musings to underscore the manner in which the DMZ today also functions as a cultural and linguistic divide between the two Koreas.  As reported by Public Radio International (PRI), preferred patterns of language usage in North versus South Korea have drifted apart over more than half a century of national division.

These days, South Korean researchers are trying to help recent arrivals from the North bridge the language gap "&...with a new smartphone app called Univoca, short for "unification vocabulary." It allows users to type in or snap a photo of an unknown word and get a North Korean translation. There’s also a section that gives practical language advice, like how to order a pizza — or an explanation of some dating terminology."
As reported by MailOnline, "Developed by Seoul's top advertising firm, Cheil Worldwide, the app offers translations of 3,600 key words culled from South Korean high school textbooks as well as everyday slang expressions.
Tapping in the Hangeul for "ice cream" brings up the word oh-reum-boseung-yi (literally "coated ice"), as ice cream is known in North Korea.
Created as a part of the company's social outreach programme, the free app has been downloaded more than 1,500 times since its launch in mid-March, said Choi Jae-Young, the Cheil manager in charge of the project.
"We were looking for ways to help socially marginalised people suffering from communication problems... and realised young North Korean defectors have this big language barrier when studying at school," Choi told AFP.
A group of North Korean defectors, including student volunteers and professionals like former school teachers, helped in the task of identifying -- and translating -- common South Korean words that may perplex the young refugees."

North Korean Defectors to Visit U.S. on Government-sponsored WEST program

Yonhap reports that a group of five North Korean defectors currently enrolled in South Korean colleges will visit the United States on a US government-sponsored programme reserved, until now, for South Korean students only, a government official said today.The five North Korean defectors will likely head for the United States next month, according to the official from Seoul's Unification Ministry."The US Embassy in South Korea and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology selected the five students in April for the West programme," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.Under the student exchange program, South Korean students can visit the United States for up to 18 months -- five months of mandatory language programmes plus internships up to one year long at US companies, followed by one month reserved for free travels.Thousands of students have visited or are visiting the United States under the programme since its launch in early 2009, but no one originally from North Korea had been offered the chance until now. "We believe the programme will help North Korean defectors get wider experience and better prepare for their future employment," the ministry official said."The ministry will consider extending the programme to more North Korean defectors," he said, adding there are currently about 850 college students here who defected from North Korea.

Future high speed rail networks

I've posted frequently about the relationship of Korea's transportation infrastructure to its communications networks and patterns of communications, touching on such topics as national unification to urbanization (see these posts).  The Korea Joongang Daily recently carried an article describing government plans to spend 74 trillion won or $62.2 billion on high speed rail development.  As shown in the first graphic (click to see a larger version) the initial phase of the project will link five cities on the outskirts of the national capital metropolitan area.   I will admit a strong personal interest in this project because it will reportedly reduce travel time from Songdo to Seoul from about an  hour and a half to only 23 minutes.
The article also notes that "Outdated rail lines along the central and southern regions of the peninsula will also be upgraded.
It currently takes more than five hours to travel from Seoul to Gangneung, Gangwon, on the east coast by train. That travel time will be cut back to one hour and seven minutes. The time it takes to travel from Busan to Gwangju on the opposite site of the Peninsula will be reduced to two hours and 20 minutes from the existing six hours and six minutes." The second graphic illustrates the major national routes that will be in service upon completion of the project in 2025.

Korea's highways and its information superhighways

I've been interested for some time in the origins of the "information superhighway" metaphor and how it took root in Korea shortly after Vice President Al Gore used it in a 1994 speech at UCLA. (e.g., see this earlier post)  However, I've recently become aware of information that sheds additional light on the power and popularity of the information superhighway metaphor, especially here in the Korean context.

First, my colleague Professor Chihyung Jeon published an article in Technology and Culture (January 2010, Vol. 51), entitled "A Road to Modernization and Unification:  The Construction of the Gyeongbu Highway in South Korea."  His article included "An Imaginary Drawing of Korea in the Year 2000" from the Dong A Ilbo, January 1, 1970 (shown at left).  Professor Jeon's research explains how President Park Chung Hee, and the Dong A Ilbo newspaper, used the metaphor of the new highway, Korea's first expressway, to symbolize the dual challenges of economic development and national reunification.  Jeon notes that, in terms of economic development along, the Gyeongbu Highway became a symbol of the "Miracle on the Han River," as South Korea's post-war economic boom became widely characterized.  However, instead of focusing on the economic impact per se, his essay zeroes in on the manner in which this famous highway became such a powerful symbol in the nation's recent historical memory.  The full article can be accessed through Project Muse or via the journal online.  I highly recommend it.
The second piece of new information came by way of yesterday's Hankyoreh newspaper, in an article which showed up when I did a Google this morning search for "미래창조과학부," the proposed new Ministry for Future Science and Innovation (my translation--the government has not yet announced the official English designation for the ministry, nor has it received the necessary stamp of approval by the National Assembly).  The Hankyoreh article (Korean language) basically argues that President Park's tenacity in insisting on approval of the new Ministry for Future Science and Innovation is because, upon close examination,  such an "ICT expressway" forms the foundation for realization of the "creative economy" one of her major campaign promises, and also the "second miracle on the Han River," that she invoked in her inaugural address last week.  The article quoted the presidential spokesman who explicitly compared the challenges faced by the proposed new ministry and the Korea Communications Commission to deal with cable, IPTV, satellite and other means for content distribution with the role played by the Gyeongbu expressway back in the mid-twentieth century industrial era.  "In the old days" according to the spokesman, the expressway stimulated the building of nearby factories and the distribution of new goods and services.  Even more specifically, the spokesman noted that just as President Park's father had utilized the Gyeongbu expressway project to create the first "Miracle on the Han River," the new president views the ICT superhighway as a core component of her plans to create a second miracle on the Han.
Metaphors play an important role in politics and in the public promotion of policy all around the world, and Korea is no exception.  For Koreans, the Gyeongbu expressway is a powerful political symbol and metaphor, which contributes in interesting ways to the influence of the newer "information superhighway" metaphor.  This post only begins to suggest some of those ways.